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ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΩΝ

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ABSTRACT:

Companies are interested in their development and growth in order to create the appropriate conditions to maximize their profits and value. What are the determinants that influence and contribute to the profitability of banks? Answers to these questions are crucial to determine and develop effective strategies to eliminate risks and enhancing the stability of the banking sector. Knowing these factors enable the creation of powerful banks, establish a policy to be effective and efficient rules for maintaining stability and boosting their efficiency.

This study analyzes the profitability of Greek banks which are listed on the Greek stock market for the period 2004 to 2010 by searching at a number of features. We attempted to measure the profitability of Greek banks by using the asset performance rate (ROA-Return On Assets – rate of net profits before taxes to total assets) and the return on equity (ROE-Return on Equity- rate of net profits before taxes to the total equity). It was found that credit risk, capital adequacy and operating costs have statistically significant impact on the profitability of banks from the endogenous factors, while from the exogenous factors the change in GDP per capita and the market power had statistically significant impact too. The age and the crisis of 2008 have also an impact but it is not statistically important. On the other hand size, liquid risk and the annual growth of deposits from the endogenous and the inflation with the market concentration from the exogenous determinants were not significant and do not affect the profitability of Greek Banks.

Keywords

Greek Banks, profitability, ROA, ROE, endogenous factors, exogenous factors, EGLS.

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 (Valsamis, 2009).

2.4. (SIGNALING THEORY)

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2.5. MODIGLIANI MILLER

Franco Modigliani Merton Miller 1958
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 μ Modigliani Miller (1958, 1963) μ
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 μ “ ” (Altman, 1984).

2.6. (AGENCY COST THEORY)

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(agency cost).

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The cost of debt is generally lower than the cost of equity, and the cost of capital is a weighted average of the two. The optimal capital structure is the one that minimizes the cost of capital. This is often achieved by having a mix of debt and equity. The pecking order theory suggests that firms have a hierarchy of financing sources: internal funds, debt, and equity. Firms first use internal funds, then debt, and finally equity. This is because debt is less expensive and has fewer taxes associated with it.

2.7. PECKING ORDER

The pecking order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), explains the financing choices of firms based on their investment opportunities and the availability of internal funds. According to this theory, firms first use internal funds (retained earnings) to finance their investments. If internal funds are insufficient, they turn to debt financing. Finally, if debt is not available or too costly, they issue equity. The theory is based on the idea that firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to use equity financing, while firms with stable cash flows are more likely to use debt. The theory also suggests that firms with high leverage are more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities, leading to underinvestment.

Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) provide empirical evidence on the pecking order theory. They show that firms with high leverage are more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities, which is consistent with the theory. Kester (1986) also provides evidence on the pecking order theory, showing that firms with high leverage are more likely to use debt financing for their investments.

The pecking order theory has been widely accepted and used to explain the financing choices of firms. It provides a clear and intuitive framework for understanding the financing decisions of firms.

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(Bourke, 1989; Abreu Mendes, 2002; Naceur, 2003)

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(et al. 2008).

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 Molyneux Thornton 1993, Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999 & 2000,
 Bikker and Hu 2002
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 Neely Wheelock (1997), Naceur (2003), Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003),
 Naceur and Goaeid (2001 & 2005), Goddard μ 2004 –
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 μ Berger (1987), Berger (1995), Neely
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$$ROA = \alpha_i + \beta_1 * Age_i + \beta_2 * Size_i + \beta_3 * Cap.Adeq_i + \beta_4 * Liquidi + \beta_5 * CreditRisk_i + \beta_6 * Oper.Expi + \beta_7 * Growth_i + \beta_8 * GDP + \beta_9 * Crisis + \beta_{10} * Inflation + \beta_{11} * MarketPower + \beta_{12} * MarketConc$$

Age : i , (μ μ)
Size : μ i ,
Cap.Adeq : i
Liquidi : i ,
CreditRisk : i ,
per.Expi : i
Growth : μ i ,
Gdp :
Crisis : 2008 μ μ μ 1 0.
Inflation : O μ
MarketPower :
MarketConc : μ
 (Herfindahl-Hirshman)

ROE μ μ Gilbert (1984) Molyneux (1993)
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$H_1 : \mu \mu$
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(Petersen Rajan, 1997).

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 $H_2 : \mu \mu$

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$H_3 : \mu$ μ

2004 μ μ μ μ Goddard, Molyneux Wilson

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(Goddard et al. 2004).

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(Agency cost theory)

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H₈ : μ μ

μ μ Demirguc-Kunt Huizinga (1999), Bikker Hu
(2002), ο μ μ

H₉ : μ μ

μ μ μ 2008 μ μ

2008

H₁₀ :

Perry (1992),

Bikker Hu (2002), Bourke
(1989), Molyneux Thornton (1992) Athanasoglou et al (2005)

Demirgüç-Kunt Huizinga
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(Smirlock, 1985).

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 . Heggsted 1979, μ 1961-1976
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 . μ , Gilbert 1984 μ
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 μ 27 56 μ μ .

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A/A				μ μ
1.		Age		
2.		Size	μ	
3.		Cap.Adeq.		
4.		Liq.risk		
5.		CreditRisk		
6.		Oper.Expense		
7.		Growth	μ	
A/A				μ μ
1.		Gdp	μ	
2.	μ	Crisis_2008	μ μ 1 2008 μ μ 0	
3.	μ	Inflation	μ	
4.		MarketPower		
5.		MarketConc	herfindahl-Hirshman: μ	

5.

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μ μ RO (

(Pierce, 2007).
 Pierce(1970), Ljung-Box(1978),
 Bartlett (1946).

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).

$$VIF_j = 1 / (1 - R_j^2)$$
 where R_j^2 is the coefficient of determination for the regression of the j -th independent variable on the other independent variables.
 If $R_j^2 = 0$, then $VIF_j = 1$.
 As R_j^2 increases, VIF_j increases.
 A VIF_j value of 10 or more indicates a serious multicollinearity problem.
 (cross section weights)
(Fixed Effects).

5% (p<0.05).

ROE

RO

16.98995.

(RO).

5%)

:

$$RO = 0,082803 - 16.98995*creditris + 0.668782*cap.adeq+0.011159*GDP$$

5.3.

(ROA - Return On Assets –

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on Equity -

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ROA

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
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2009

1995 – 2005. Stierwald μ

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μ . Beck et al μ 2005 —

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	Andreas Stierwald	Determinants of firm profitability – The effect of productivity and its persistence	2009	μ μ
	Beck T., Cull R. and Feikhena J.	Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria	2005	μ μ

5.4.2

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Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga μ

1999 μ

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Fotopoulos Louri (2000),

Opler Titman to 1994 o Altman 1984 μ
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(moral hazard).

Naceur Goaied (2001) μ
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2007
15 1995 - 2001
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	Pecking Order (Myers and Majluf 1984)			
	(Ross 1977,1978)			
	Pasiouras F. and Kosmidou K.	Factors influencing the profitability of domestic and foreign commercial banks in the European Union	2007	
	Abreu M. and V. Mendes,	Commercial bank interest margins and profitability: Evidence from E.U countries	2002	
	Bikker J.A. and H. Hu	Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of Banks	2002	
	Naceur, S.B. and Goaied, M.	The Determinants of the Tunisian Deposit Banks' Performance	2001	
	Fotopoulos G. Louri H.	Determinants of hazard confronting new entry: Does financial structure matter?	2000	
	Asli Demirgüç-Kunt Harry Huizinga	Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence	1999	
	Berger, A.	The Relationship Between Capital and Earnings in Banking	1995	
	Opler, Tim Sheridan Titman,	Financial Distress and Corporate Performance	1994	
	Altman, E.	A Further Empirical Investigation of Bankruptcy Costs	1984	

5.4.3.

Miller
 Noulas 1997
 Bourke 1989
 Molyneux and Thornton 1992
 Cooper (2003)
 Jackson and Patterson
 Bashir 2000,
 et al 2008
 et al 2005

			2008	
Athanasoglou P.P., Brissimis S.N., and Delis M.D.	Bank-Specific, Industry-Specific and Macroeconomic Determinants of Bank Profitability		2005	
Cooper M., Jackson W. and G. Patterson	Evidence of predictability in the cross-section of bank stock returns		2003	
Bashir A.	Assessing the Performance of Islamic Banks: Some Evidence from the Middle East		2000	
Miller S. and Noulas A.	Portfolio mix and large-bank profitability in the USA		1997	
Molyneux P. and Thornton J.	Determinants of European Bank Profitability: A Note		1992	
Bourke P.	Concentration and Other Determinants of Bank Profitability in Europe, North America and Australia		1989	

5.4.4.

Molyneux and Thornton (1992) study the determinants of bank profitability in Europe, North America and Australia from 1989 to 2000. Their findings indicate that bank profitability is determined by a number of factors, including bank size, capital structure, and industry concentration.

Athanasoglou, P.P., Brissimis, S.N. and Delis, M.D. (2005) examine the determinants of bank profitability in Greece from 1994 to 2006. They find that bank profitability is positively affected by bank size and capital structure, and negatively affected by industry concentration.

E. Mamatzakis and P. Remoundos (2003) study the determinants of Greek commercial bank profitability from 1989 to 2000. They find that bank profitability is positively affected by bank size and capital structure, and negatively affected by industry concentration.

Bourke (1989) examines the determinants of bank profitability in Europe, North America and Australia. He finds that bank profitability is positively affected by bank size and capital structure, and negatively affected by industry concentration.

Author(s)	Title	Year	Country
Athanasoglou, P.P., Brissimis, S.N. and Delis, M.D.	Bank-Specific, Industry - Specific and Macroeconomic Determinants of Bank Profitability	2005	Greece
E. Mamatzakis and P. Remoundos	Determinants of Greek Commercial Banks Profitability, 1989 – 2000	2003	Greece
Molyneux, P. and Thornton, J.	Determinants of European Bank Profitability: A Note	1992	Europe, North America and Australia
Bourke, P.,	Concentration and Other Determinants of Bank Profitability in Europe, North America and Australia	1989	Europe, North America and Australia

5.4.5

Neely M. and Wheelock D. (1997) 'Why does bank performance vary across states?' *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 10(2), pp. 30-45.

Pasiouras F. and Kosmidou K. (2007) 'Factors influencing the profitability of domestic and foreign commercial banks in the European Union' *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 19(4), pp. 30-45.

Bikker J.A. and Hu H. (2002) 'Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of Banks' *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 14(2), pp. 30-45.

Demirgüç-Kunt A. and Huizinga H. (1999) 'Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence' *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 11(4), pp. 30-45.

	Pasiouras F. and Kosmidou K.	Factors influencing the profitability of domestic and foreign commercial banks in the European Union	2007	
	Bikker J.A. and H. Hu	Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of Banks	2002	
	Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga	Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence	1999	
	Neely M. and Wheelock D.	Why does bank performance vary across states?	1997	

5.4.6 2008

Demirgüç-Kunt A. et al. (2000) 'Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence' *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 12(4), pp. 30-45.

(2012).

2008				
	Altunbas Y., Gambacorta L., Marques-Ibanez D.	Does monetary policy affect bank risk?	2012	
	Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache and Poonam Gupta	Inside the Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of Banking Systems in Distress	2000	

5.4.7

Hicks 1935 “quiet life” hypothesis (QLH). Berger Hannan 1998 5000 1980 1989, Delis Tsionas 2009 1999 – 2006 QLH.

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 Staikouras Wood μ 2004
 1994-1998
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	“Quiet life” Hypothesis Hicks J. (1935)			
	Maria-Eleni K. Agoraki, Manthos D. Delis Fotios Pasiouras	Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries	2011	
	Delis M.D. Tsionas E.G.	The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency,	2009	
	Christos K. Staikouras, Geoffrey E. Wood	The determinants of European bank profitability	2004	
	Berger A.N. Hannan T.H.	The efficiency cost of market power in the banking industry: A test of the “quiet life” and related hypotheses	1998	
	Agu, C.C.	Analysis of the Determinants of the Nigerian Banking systems’ profits and profitability performance	1992	
	Heggsted Arnold A.	Market Structure, Risk, and Profitability in Commercial Banking	1977	
	Hicks J.	Annual survey of economic theory: The theory of monopoly	1935	

5.4.8

	Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson		2004	
	Aburime	2008	33	
		2000	2004	
	Heggsted	1977		

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Abreu, M., and V. Mendes, 2002. Commercial bank interest margins and profitability: evidence from E.U countries, Porto Working paper series.

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FIRM	Panel
ALPHA BANK A.E.	1
ATE BANK . .	2
ATTICA BANK	3
	4
EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS . .	5
	6
	7
MARFIN . .	8
	9
	10
PROTON . .	11
T BANK	12
	13

1. GROWTH

μ Growth, μ 2004,
 μ μ ,
 μ ,
 μ :

Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 78

Autocorrelation	Partial Correlation	AC	PAC	Q-Stat	Prob	
. ***	. ***	1	0.453	0.453	16.605	0.000
. *	. *	2	0.109	-0.120	17.585	0.000
. *	. **	3	0.169	0.214	19.959	0.000
. *	. *	4	0.079	-0.112	20.481	0.000
. .	. .	5	0.018	0.051	20.508	0.001

$$Growth_{i,t} = a + b \cdot Growth_{i,t-1} + V_{i,t} \quad (1)$$


$$Growth_{i,2004} = \frac{1}{b} \cdot (Growth_{i,2005} - a)$$

output

Dependent Variable: GROWTH
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample (adjusted): 2006 2010
 Periods included: 5
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 65
 Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix
 Convergence achieved after 6 total coef iterations

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1.09E+09	5.24E+08	2.083609	0.0413
AR(1)	0.638882	0.100309	6.369123	0.0000
Weighted Statistics				
R-squared	0.391691	Mean dependent var	3.21E+09	
Adjusted R-squared	0.382035	S.D. dependent var	3.34E+09	
S.E. of regression	3.13E+09	Sum squared resid	6.17E+20	
F-statistic	40.56573	Durbin-Watson stat	2.023587	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			
Unweighted Statistics				
R-squared	0.227061	Mean dependent var	2.90E+09	
Sum squared resid	7.93E+20	Durbin-Watson stat	2.086884	
Inverted AR Roots	.64			

μ : μ μ μ



Jarque - Bera

probability = 0,377325 > 0.05

μ
 μ
 μ . μ
 μ , =1,09 +09 b=0,638882 μ μ
 μ μ μ growth_estimated
 μμ :

```

genr lead_growth =growth(1)
genr growth_estimated=growth
smpl if year = 2004
growth_estimated=(1/0.638882)*(lead_growth - 1.09E+09)
smpl @all

```

2.

ROA

μ ROA μ μ , μ μμ
 μ . , μ
 μ μ μ 5% (Sig <5%).
 μ , μ²,
 μ .

	R^2	μ
CREDITRISK	0,52	
CAP_ADEQ	0,29	
OPER_EXP	0,21	
CRISIS_2008	0,17	
GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA	0,15	
LIQUIDRISK	0,13	
GROWTH_ESTIMATED	0,06	
Marketpower	0,05	
Inflation	0,01	
SIZE	0,00	
AGE	0,00	
MarketConc	0,00	

R^2 .

AIC,

μ	AIC	μ
CREDITRISK	-5,943	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ	-6,940	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP	-7,163	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008	-7,526	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008, GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA	-7,504	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008, LIQUIDRISK	-7,520	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008, GROWTH_ESTIMATED	-7,542	
CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008, Marketpower	-7,563	

AIC,

output μ

:

Dependent Variable: ROA
 Method: Panel Least Squares
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.014760	0.002792	5.286162	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-0.711458	0.048232	-14.75076	0.0000
CAP_ADEQ	0.101626	0.006729	15.10325	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-0.506441	0.091654	-5.525588	0.0000
CRISIS_2008	-0.007866	0.001361	-5.781647	0.0000
MARKETPOWER	0.023504	0.010244	2.294401	0.0242

R-squared	0.912764	Mean dependent var	0.002103
Adjusted R-squared	0.907632	S.D. dependent var	0.017569
S.E. of regression	0.005340	Akaike info criterion	-7.563690
Sum squared resid	0.002423	Schwarz criterion	-7.398139
Log likelihood	350.1479	Hannan-Quinn criter.	-7.496900
F-statistic	177.8727	Durbin-Watson stat	1.739162
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

μ effects Fixed effects output μ μ Fixed :
 μ μ μ :

Dependent Variable: ROA
 Method: Panel Least Squares
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.016464	0.003307	4.978591	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-0.767589	0.049302	-15.56899	0.0000
CAP_ADEQ	0.110658	0.007816	14.15847	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-0.517012	0.138201	-3.741003	0.0004
CRISIS_2008	-0.007167	0.001330	-5.390422	0.0000

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared	0.937096	Mean dependent var	0.002103
Adjusted R-squared	0.923496	S.D. dependent var	0.017569
S.E. of regression	0.004859	Akaike info criterion	-7.648949
Sum squared resid	0.001747	Schwarz criterion	-7.179888
Log likelihood	365.0272	Hannan-Quinn criter.	-7.459712
F-statistic	68.90011	Durbin-Watson stat	2.120013
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

$\mu\mu$ μ :

Dependent Variable: ROA
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91
 Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.012362	0.002511	4.923135	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-0.811029	0.038098	-21.28793	0.0000
CAP_ADEQ	0.096048	0.013238	7.255348	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-0.257414	0.094764	-2.716364	0.0082
CRISIS_2008	-0.006283	0.000855	-7.348615	0.0000

Effects Specification


Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Weighted Statistics

R-squared	0.958706	Mean dependent var	0.003597
Adjusted R-squared	0.949777	S.D. dependent var	0.020315
S.E. of regression	0.004516	Sum squared resid	0.001509
F-statistic	107.3761	Durbin-Watson stat	2.138498
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.929399	Mean dependent var	0.002103
Sum squared resid	0.001961	Durbin-Watson stat	2.463609



Jarque - Bera

μ

probability = 0,203327 > 0.05

μ μ μ μ
μ .

μ

μ μ . μ AGE MARKETPOWER μ

μ :

Omitted Variables: AGE

F-statistic	5.351568	Prob. F(1,73)	0.0235
-------------	----------	---------------	--------

Omitted Variables: MARKETPOWER

F-statistic	8.089407	Prob. F(1,72)	0.0058
-------------	----------	---------------	--------

output μ μ μ :

Dependent Variable: ROA
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91
 Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.102982	0.020247	5.086344	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-0.797069	0.036189	-22.02504	0.0000
CAP_ADEQ	0.084808	0.013417	6.321114	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-0.619566	0.108100	-5.731421	0.0000
CRISIS_2008	-0.004132	0.000983	-4.201440	0.0001
AGE	-0.001194	0.000300	-3.986169	0.0002
MARKETPOWER	-0.093431	0.019171	-4.873487	0.0000

Effects Specification


Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Weighted Statistics


R-squared	0.966619	Mean dependent var	0.005971
Adjusted R-squared	0.958274	S.D. dependent var	0.022993
S.E. of regression	0.004414	Sum squared resid	0.001403
F-statistic	115.8282	Durbin-Watson stat	2.228551
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.931509	Mean dependent var	0.002103
Sum squared resid	0.001903	Durbin-Watson stat	2.705103



Jarque - Bera
 probability = 0,608813 > 0.05.



Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 91

Autocorrelation	Partial Correlation	AC	PAC	Q-Stat	Prob
** .	** .	1	-0.330 -0.330	10.234	0.001
. .	.* .	2	-0.011 -0.134	10.246	0.006
* .	** .	3	-0.195 -0.279	13.919	0.003
. *	. .	4	0.165 -0.012	16.572	0.002
* .	* .	5	-0.070 -0.069	17.051	0.004
. .	* .	6	-0.059 -0.158	17.398	0.008

AC PAC
 Q-Statistics
 BPL (Box-Pierce-Ljung statistics).

μ
Bartlett, μμ
μμ , μ
μ μ μ
Box- Pierce. μ
μ 5%.

μ μ . μ
μ , μ CAP_ADEQ.

Sample: 2004 2010
Included observations: 91
Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CAP_ADEQ(-i)	RESID,CAP_ADEQ(+i)	i	lag	lead
. **	. **	0	0.2382	0.2382
. .	*** .	1	-0.0032	-0.2746
. * .	. * .	2	-0.1210	-0.0490
. * .	. .	3	-0.1459	-0.0134
. **	. .	4	0.1995	-0.0205
. **	. .	5	0.1852	-0.0306
. .	. .	6	0.0345	0.0010

μ
CAP_ADEQ,


$COV(YPOLOIPA_t, CAP_ADEQ_{t+1}) \neq 0$ μ μ μ

μ .

μ

μ CREDITRISK, CAP_ADEQ, OPER_EXP, CRISIS_2008, AGE,
MARKETPOWER μ μ Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
μ fixed effects, μ μ
μ μ μ
CAP_ADEQ, μ

Mean of CAP_ADEQ by PANEL



```

11:
      PANEL      RESID      CREDITRISK      CAP_ADEQ
11.00000      -0.018706      0.000000      0.358689

      creditrisk      0,
      creditrisk.      2
11:
      RESID      CAP_ADEQ      PANEL
0.012344      0.110373      11.00000
0.022535      0.809337      11.00000

      Cap_adeq      11,
      COV YPOLOIPA_t, CAP_ADEQ_{t+1} ≠ 0
      11      μ      smpl if panel <> 11.      output
      μ      11      :
  
```

:
 Dependent Variable: ROA
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 12
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 84
 Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.105140	0.018129	5.799435	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-0.799457	0.031710	-25.21120	0.0000
CAP_ADEQ	0.049201	0.017014	2.891748	0.0052
OPER_EXP	-0.625794	0.098756	-6.336739	0.0000
CRISIS_2008	-0.004833	0.000848	-5.698055	0.0000
AGE	-0.001073	0.000256	-4.195489	0.0001
MARKETPOWER	-0.111477	0.015452	-7.214534	0.0000

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)


Weighted Statistics

R-squared	0.977035	Mean dependent var	0.005094
Adjusted R-squared	0.971120	S.D. dependent var	0.020313
S.E. of regression	0.003138	Sum squared resid	0.000650
F-statistic	165.1751	Durbin-Watson stat	2.157062
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.965482	Mean dependent var	0.000984
Sum squared resid	0.000687	Durbin-Watson stat	1.875888

μ , μ μ
 μ $\mu\mu$ μ ,
 Jarque – Bera μ
 μ .



Series: Standardized Residuals	
Sample 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11	
Observations 84	
Mean	5.94e-19
Median	2.80e-05
Maximum	0.005477
Minimum	-0.006476
Std. Dev.	0.002798
Skewness	-0.150476
Kurtosis	2.428711
Jarque-Bera	1.459299
Probability	0.482078

Box- Pierce.

5%.

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CREDITRISK(-i)	RESID,CREDITRISK(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	-0.0730	-0.0730
. .	. .	1	-0.0266	-0.0052
. .	. .	2	-0.0310	0.0364
. .	. .	3	-0.0204	-0.1206
. .	. .	4	0.0344	0.0169
. .	. .	5	0.0274	0.1442
. .	. .	6	-0.0361	0.0538

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CAP_ADEQ(-i)	RESID,CAP_ADEQ(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	0.0512	0.0512
. .	. .	1	0.0328	0.1647
. .	. .	2	-0.0077	-0.0031
. .	. .	3	-0.0610	-0.0526
. .	. .	4	0.0561	-0.0739
. .	. .	5	-0.0142	-0.0710
. .	. .	6	0.0243	-0.0455

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,OPER_EXP(-i)	RESID,OPER_EXP(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	-0.0399	-0.0399
. .	. .	1	-0.1053	0.0523
. .	. .	2	-0.0533	0.1003
. .	. .	3	-0.1098	0.1107
. .	. .	4	-0.1205	0.0780
. .	. .	5	-0.0852	0.0965
. .	. .	6	0.0254	0.0509

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CRISIS_2008(-i)	RESID,CRISIS_2008(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	-0.0252	-0.0252
. .	** .	1	-0.0081	-0.1893
. *	. .	2	0.0862	-0.0356
. *	. *	3	0.0631	0.0585
. .	. *	4	0.0108	0.0841
. .	. .	5	-0.0047	0.0168
. .	. .	6	-0.0316	-0.0252

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,AGE(-i)	RESID,AGE(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	-0.0007	-0.0007
. .	. *	1	0.0231	0.0682
. .	. .	2	0.0198	0.0073
. .	. .	3	-0.0063	-0.0080
. .	. .	4	0.0091	0.0158
. .	. .	5	-0.0087	-0.0185
* .	. .	6	-0.0740	-0.0269

Sample: 2004 2010 IF PANEL <>11
 Included observations: 84
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,MARKETPOWER(-i)	RESID,MARKETPOWER(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	0.0087	0.0087
. .	. .	1	0.0457	0.0339
. *	. .	2	0.0907	-0.0346
. *	* .	3	0.0947	-0.0699
. *	* .	4	0.0639	-0.0980
. .	* .	5	0.0380	-0.0944
. .	* .	6	-0.0355	-0.0433

μ μ μ Variance Inflation Factors

:

<i>j</i>	R_j^2	VIF_j
CREDITRISK	0,30	1,43
CAP_ADEQ	0,16	1,19
OPER_EXP	0,53	2,12
CRISIS_2011	0,29	1,40
AGE	0,23	1,29
MARKETPOWER	0,47	1,89

μ μ μ AIC,
 μ .
output μ :

Dependent Variable: ROE
 Method: Panel Least Squares
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.537499	0.090129	5.963665	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-16.19484	2.494249	-6.492871	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-14.69977	3.945389	-3.725810	0.0003
CRISIS_2008	-0.241021	0.067630	-3.563813	0.0006
R-squared	0.589282	Mean dependent var		-0.056789
Adjusted R-squared	0.575120	S.D. dependent var		0.429306
S.E. of regression	0.279834	Akaike info criterion		0.333720
Sum squared resid	6.812712	Schwarz criterion		0.444087
Log likelihood	-11.18426	Hannan-Quinn criter.		0.378246
F-statistic	41.60812	Durbin-Watson stat		1.577225
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

μ Fixed effects **output** μ μ **Fixed**
effects :

Dependent Variable: ROE
 Method: Panel Least Squares
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.304988	0.162297	1.879202	0.0641
CREDITRISK	-18.53233	2.560272	-7.238420	0.0000
OPER_EXP	-3.462051	7.125776	-0.485849	0.6285
CRISIS_2008	-0.172720	0.066710	-2.589139	0.0116

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared	0.709077	Mean dependent var		-0.056789
Adjusted R-squared	0.650893	S.D. dependent var		0.429306
S.E. of regression	0.253657	Akaike info criterion		0.252608
Sum squared resid	4.825636	Schwarz criterion		0.694078
Log likelihood	4.506313	Hannan-Quinn criter.		0.430714
F-statistic	12.18669	Durbin-Watson stat		2.143992
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

5%). μ μ OPER_EXP μ (Sig = 0,6285 <

Fixed Effects μ μ :

Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section fixed effects

Effects Test	Statistic	d.f.	Prob.
Cross-section F	2.573593	(12,75)	0.0065
Cross-section Chi-square	31.381144	12	0.0017

output μ :


Dependent Variable: ROE
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2004 2010
Periods included: 7
Cross-sections included: 13
Total panel (balanced) observations: 91

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.228656	0.040494	5.646600	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-18.66798	2.532179	-7.372297	0.0000
CRISIS_2008	-0.156656	0.057647	-2.717494	0.0081

Effects Specification


Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared	0.708162	Mean dependent var	-0.056789
Adjusted R-squared	0.654402	S.D. dependent var	0.429306
S.E. of regression	0.252379	Akaike info criterion	0.233773
Sum squared resid	4.840824	Schwarz criterion	0.647651
Log likelihood	4.363335	Hannan-Quinn criter.	0.400747
F-statistic	13.17272	Durbin-Watson stat	2.130979
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		



Jarque - Bera

probability = 0,0000 < 0.05



output

Dependent Variable: ROE
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91
 Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.181141	0.015791	11.47147	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-17.09899	1.287357	-13.28224	0.0000
CRISIS_2008	-0.088599	0.013101	-6.762521	0.0000

Effects Specification


Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Weighted Statistics

R-squared	0.875554	Mean dependent var	0.159013
Adjusted R-squared	0.852630	S.D. dependent var	0.601813
S.E. of regression	0.209039	Sum squared resid	3.321008
F-statistic	38.19332	Durbin-Watson stat	2.085851
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.697781	Mean dependent var	-0.056789
Sum squared resid	5.013016	Durbin-Watson stat	2.085370



Jarque - Bera
probability = 0,0000 < 0.05

CRISIS_2008
GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA.
Output
GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA : CREDITRISK

Dependent Variable: ROE
 Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
 Sample: 2004 2010
 Periods included: 7
 Cross-sections included: 13
 Total panel (balanced) observations: 91
 Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.131107	0.017306	7.575780	0.0000
CREDITRISK	-16.88717	1.341309	-12.59007	0.0000
GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA	0.011940	0.001889	6.319796	0.0000

Effects Specification


Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Weighted Statistics

R-squared	0.878161	Mean dependent var	0.227346
Adjusted R-squared	0.855717	S.D. dependent var	0.700397
S.E. of regression	0.231653	Sum squared resid	4.078396
F-statistic	39.12664	Durbin-Watson stat	2.042411
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.687726	Mean dependent var	-0.056789
Sum squared resid	5.179788	Durbin-Watson stat	2.109341



Jarque - Bera

μ ,

Jarque - Bera

probability = 0,112745 >

0.05

μ

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μ .

Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 91

Autocorrelation	Partial Correlation	AC	PAC	Q-Stat	Prob	
. *	. *	1	0.081	0.081	0.6231	0.430
.* .	.* .	2	-0.076	-0.083	1.1715	0.557
.* .	.* .	3	-0.195	-0.184	4.8254	0.185
.* .	.* .	4	-0.156	-0.139	7.2033	0.126
.* .	.* .	5	-0.121	-0.139	8.6371	0.124
. .	.* .	6	-0.033	-0.088	8.7488	0.188

AC PAC

Q-Statistics

BPL (Box-Pierce-Ljung statistics).

Bartlett, μμ

Box- Pierce. μ

5%.

Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 91
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CREDITRISK(-i)	RESID,CREDITRISK(+i)	i	lag	lead
.* .	.* .	0	-0.1123	-0.1123
. .	. .	1	-0.0155	-0.0326
.* .	.* .	2	-0.0720	-0.0983
. * .	. .	3	0.0752	0.0489
. * .	. .	4	0.0722	-0.0341
. * .	. * .	5	0.0640	0.0849
. .	. .	6	-0.0125	0.0320

Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 91
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,CAP_ADEQ(-i)	RESID,CAP_ADEQ(+i)	i	lag	lead
. .	. .	0	-0.0131	-0.0131
.* .	.* .	1	-0.0549	-0.1264
. .	.* .	2	-0.0038	-0.0584
. *	.* .	3	0.0867	-0.0840
. **	.* .	4	0.2047	-0.0525
. *	. .	5	0.1144	-0.0393
. .	. .	6	0.0348	-0.0083

Sample: 2004 2010
 Included observations: 91
 Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations

RESID,GDP_GROWTH_PE R_CAPITA(-i)	RESID,GDP_GROWTH_PE R_CAPITA(+i)	i	lag	lead
. *	. *	0	0.1044	0.1044
. *	. **	1	0.0922	0.1619
.* .	. *	2	-0.0577	0.0590
. .	.* .	3	-0.0198	-0.0770
.* .	.* .	4	-0.0799	-0.0853
. .	.* .	5	-0.0203	-0.0708
. .	. .	6	-0.0153	0.0086

μ μ μ Variance Inflation Factors

:

<i>j</i>	R_j^2	VIF_j
CREDITRISK	0,120084	1,14
GDP_GROWTH_PER_CAPITA	0,131198	1,15
CAP_ADEQ	0,016613	1,02

VIF μ μ

μ . μ μ μ 10.

μ μ μ μ μ

μ μ 10. μ

μ μ μμ .

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